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I. Introduction
The first known oil lease dates back to 1853, located in Pennsylvania’s Oil
Creek region.1 Although theories of oil and gas ownership vary by jurisdiction
today,2 courts have long-recognized for a landowner, “the right to explore for these

* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2018. Thank you to
Professor Alan Romero for his expertise and guidance, the Wyoming Law Review Board for its
attentiveness and edits, my friends and family for all the support, and most of all, to my husband
Eric for his encouragement throughout this process.
1
Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise
ed. 2015).

on the

Law

of

Oil

and

Gas § 1.32 (Matthew Bender, rev.

1 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 203
(LexisNexis ed. 2016).
2
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substances, and to reduce them to possession if found, is a valuable part of his
property.”3 Mineral interests may be reserved or created by deed.4 Alternatively,
landowners may grant operators mineral exploration rights under an oil and gas
lease.5 These intricate transactions and relationships occasionally led to tensions
between landowners and operators, shaping the contemporary oil and gas lease.6
To complicate matters, numerous landowners may be involved with an
operator-lessee, where past conveyances severed minerals from the surface estate,
creating two separate estates.7 In 2005, the Wyoming Legislature enacted the
Split Estate Act to enhance protections for surface owners and balance power
between the parties.8 By encouraging good faith negotiations for surface use
agreements, the Act aims to guarantee operators perform surface reclamation and
reimburse surface owners for damages resulting from mineral exploration and
production.9 In Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, the Wyoming Supreme Court
held the operator remained liable under a surface use agreement because it failed
to include an exculpatory clause in the original agreement or obtain a subsequent
novation prior to assignment.10
Although the Pennaco court arrived at the correct conclusion, its narrow
contract-based analysis results in lingering property questions, and conceivably
undesired implications for surface owners and operators alike.11 The Background
section of this Case Note first details ongoing liability under agreements pursuant
to contract, oil and gas, and property law, jurisdictional applications, and the
Split Estate Act.12 A description of the case, the court’s analysis, and holding in
Pennaco follows in the Principal Case section.13 Finally, the Analysis provides
the appropriate legal approach and policy to determine liability in this case, the
practical consequences of the Pennaco decision, and recommendations for parties
to reconcile the court’s reasoning.14

3

Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 292 S.W. 743, 745 (1927).

4

1 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 301.

5

1 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 601.

6

Id.

7

See 1 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 218.

See Randall T. Cox, Analysis of the Wyoming Split Estate Act, W.S. 30-5-401, et seq., The
Wyoming Lawyer, February 2014, at 39, http://digitaleditions.walsworthprintgroup.com/publica
tion/?i=197015&article_id= 1633994&view=articleBrowser&ver=html5#{%22issue_id%22:1970
15,%22view%22:%22articleBrowser%22,%22article_id%22:%221633994%22.
8

9

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-5-401– 410 (2016).

10

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 46, 371 P.3d 120, 131 (Wyo. 2016).

11

See infra notes 213 – 42 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 213 – 42 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 15 –117 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 118 –242 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss2/8

2

Romano: OIL AND GAS LAW—Owning Liability Without Ownership Rights: Harmon

2017

Case Note

393

II. Background
A. Transferring Liability Pursuant to Contract Principles and Oil
and Gas Law
Contract law “attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have
been induced by the making of a promise.”15 Freedom to contract is a coveted
policy woven into the fabric of contract doctrine.16 These fundamental objectives
manifest in the court’s review of contract construction and enforcement.17
Provided the contract language is clear and unambiguous, the court looks only
within the four corners of the agreement,18 giving the words their plain and
ordinary everyday meaning.19 The court also analyzes the contract in its entirety,
considering the words and language used to interpret the parties’ intent.20 If
the court finds the language is ambiguous or inconsistent, it may consider
parol evidence.21 However, if parties adopt a contract and demonstrate their
intent that the writing includes a complete statement of the agreed upon terms,
parol evidence does not govern.22 The parties’ relationship, transaction type,
preliminary negotiations, and commercially reasonable trade usage influence the
determined meaning.23 Finally, the court construes ambiguous contract terms
against the drafter.24
Understanding the implications of foundational contract interpretation rules
is vital in complex, multi-party transactions common to the energy industry,
and requires hypervigilance in drafting assignment terms with potential impacts

15

Corbin on Contracts § 1.1 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2016).

16

See Corbin on Contracts § 79.01 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2014).

17

See infra notes 18 –24 and accompanying text.

N. Fork Land & Cattle, LLLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2015 WY 150, ¶ 10, 362 P.3d
341, 345– 46 (Wyo. 2015) (citing Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d
1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993)).
18

Felix Felicis, LLC v. Riva Ridge Owners Ass’n, 2016 WY 67, ¶ 18, 375 P.3d 769, 775
(Wyo. 2016) (citations omitted).
19

See N. Fork Land & Cattle, LLLP, ¶ 14, 362 P.3d at 346 (citing Doctors’ Co. v. Ins. Corp.
of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 –24 (Wyo. 1993)).
20

21
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 cmt. a–b (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (explaining
the parol evidence rule “defines the subject matter of interpretation” and “renders inoperative prior
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements”).
22

Id. § 213 cmt. c.

23

Id. § 212 cmt. b.

Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d
529, 532 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Prudential Preferred Properties v. Underwood Ranch Co., 873 P.2d
598, 600 (Wyo. 1994)).
24
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on operations for years ahead.25 Oil and gas leases generally contain a clause
authorizing assignment of mineral interests and a similar reference in the common
language about “running of the covenants of the lease to assignees.”26
Contract principles address liability when a party assigns agreement rights.27
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, “[u]nless the obligee agrees otherwise,
neither delegation of performance nor a contract to assume the duty made
with the obligor by the person delegated discharges any duty or liability of the
delegating obligor.”28 Thus, even if a party assigns its contractual rights and
interests, any duties under the contract are generally delegated and assignor retains
its obligation under the original agreement, unless the assignment is coupled with
express novation.29 A novation30 “discharges the original duty, just as any other
substituted contract does, so that breach of the new duty gives no right of action
on the old duty.”31
Parties may also include exculpatory clauses in agreements to shift liability.32
To illustrate, lessees typically include language in oil and gas leases discharging
their liability and holding any successor in interest fully responsible for breaches
occurring after assignment.33 However, if the assignor fails to include an explicit
exculpatory clause, oil and gas law holds the original lessee liable for any breach of
lease covenant arising subsequent to assignment.34
In addition, oil and gas leases commonly include some provisions also
addressed under a separate surface use agreement.35 Frequently overlapping terms
benefitting the lessee under an oil and gas lease include surface easements for well

25

See infra notes 213 – 42 and accompanying text.

2 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 402
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2016).
26

27

See infra notes 28 –34 and accompanying text.

28

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 318 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).

29

Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts §18-25 (West Academic Publishing 7th ed. 2014).

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 280 (defining novation as “a substituted contract
that includes as a party one who was neither the obligor nor the obligee of the original duty.”).
30

Id. § 280 illus. 1 (“A owes B $1,000. B promises A that he will discharge the debt
immediately if C will promise B to pay B $1,000. C so promises. There is a novation under which
B’s and C’s promises are consideration for each other and A is discharged.”).
31

Exculpatory Clause, The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary (desk ed. 2012) (“[A]
contract provision by which one party expressly agrees not to hold the other party liable for some
past or future conduct.”).
32

5 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 64.6 (Matthew Bender, rev.
ed. 2015).
33

34

2 Martin & Kramer, supra note 26 § 403.1.

35

See 1 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 218.
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locations, equipment, access roads, and pipelines.36 While “all writings which are
part of the same transaction are interpreted together,”37 the parties must include
express language demonstrating their intent to incorporate the writings.38

B. Determining Ongoing Liability Under Property Law
Property principles are pertinent to oil and gas transactions because
exploration and production relate to both the surface and mineral estates.39 While
many parties create land use promises by contract, property doctrine is imbedded
in these easements and covenants.40 The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
describes these principles and its scope as follows:
(1) A servitude is a legal device that creates a right or an
obligation that runs with land or an interest in land.41
...
(2) The servitudes covered by this Restatement are easements,
profits, and covenants. To the extent that special rules and
considerations apply to the following servitudes, they are not
within the scope of this Restatement :
(a) covenants in leases ;
...
(c) profits for the removal of timber, oil, gas, and minerals.42
Easements create “a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized

36

Id.

37

Williston on Contracts § 30:25 (3d ed.).

38

Id.

39

See 5 Kuntz, supra note 33 § 3.1.

40

Restatement (First) of Prop. § Scope (Am. Law Inst. 1936).

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 1.1 (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (further
describing servitudes: “(a) Running with land means that the right or obligation passes
automatically to successive owners or occupiers of the land or the interest in land with which the
right or obligation runs. (b) A right that runs with land is called a “benefit” and the interest in
land with which it runs may be called the “benefited” or “dominant” estate. (c) An obligation that
runs with land is called a “burden” and the interest in land with which it runs may be called the
“burdened” or “servient” estate.”).
41

42

Id. (emphasis added).
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by the easement.”43 If parties create an easement by conveyance, nothing
additional is required to form the intended easement.44 Further, “[a] covenant is
a servitude if either the benefit or the burden runs with land. A covenant that is a
servitude ‘runs with land.’”45
The Restatement identifies circumstances when an assignor’s liability under
a covenant continues, dependent upon the parties’ intent and expectations.46
Where a servitude in gross exists, contract principles are determinative.47 If a
servitude lasts for indefinite or perpetual periods, any servitude burden arising
after an original party transfers burdened property rights to a third party is
no longer binding on assignor.48 Conversely, where duration of the servitude
is limited, the principles governing a landlord-tenant relationship apply.49 A
lessee cannot terminate its duties by assignment, based on privity of contract or
estate.50 Further, a lessee must generally restore the premises at the landlord’s

43
Id. § 1.2 (further describing easements: “(2) A profit a prendre is an easement that confers
the right to enter and remove timber, minerals, oil, gas, game, or other substances from land in
the possession of another. It is referred to as a “profit” in this Restatement. (3) The burden of an
easement or profit is always appurtenant. The benefit may be either appurtenant or in gross.”).
44

Restatement (First) of Prop. § Scope.

45

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 1.3.

Id. § 4.4 cmt. a (“a. Application. The rules stated in this section apply only as an aid to
determining the intent or expectations of the parties . . . in creating a servitude. . . . [T]he parties
are free to determine the duration of their rights and obligations under a servitude. If their intent to
do so is ascertained, it should be given effect.”).
46

47

Id. § 4.4(3).

48

Id. § 4.4(1).

Id. § 4.4 cmt. b (“b. . . . This rule is different from that which obtains in the law of
landlord and tenant where the original tenant generally remains liable on the covenants in the lease
after assignment of the term. The difference results from the likely difference in the expectations
of parties to leases and parties to covenants among fee owners. In the lease transaction, the duration
of the tenant’s liability is limited by the duration of the lease term, and the landlord is thought to
have relied on the tenant’s creditworthiness in determining to enter into the lease. By contrast,
servitudes created by fee owners generally have an indeterminate or perpetual duration (see § 4.3(4)
and (5)), and neither party is likely to have expected the other to be liable after transfer of the
burdened interest. . . .”).
49

50
Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant § 16.1(1)(a)–(b) (Am. Law Inst.
1997) (“(1) A transferor of an interest in leased property, who immediately before the transfer
is obligated to perform an express promise contained in the lease that touches and concerns the
transferred interest, continues to be obligated after the transfer if: (a) the obligation rests on
privity of contract, and he is not relieved of the obligation by the person entitled to enforce it; or
(b) the obligation rests solely on privity of estate and the transfer does not terminate his privity of
estate with the person entitled to enforce the obligation, and that person does not relieve him of
the obligation.”).
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request, and a landlord may recoup damages if lessee fails to satisfy this duty.51 Oil
and gas law incorporates these landlord-tenant principles.52
As noted, oil and gas leases generally include express language creating
easements on the servient surface estate to benefit the dominant mineral estate.53
Pursuant to oil and gas law, a surface easement of this nature typically creates a
“mutual and simultaneous” property interest to provide the required privity of
estate for covenants running with the land.54 Therefore, when a party grants or
reserves a mineral interest, any associated surface easement is appurtenant.55
Though infrequent, some historic oil and gas leases appeared to grant fee
simple absolute mineral interests.56 In these cases, some courts concluded these
fee interests could be terminated where abandoned.57 Leases conveying mineral
interests in fee absolute no longer exist because lessors opposed a lessee’s ability
to hold a lease for an extended duration, with no requirement to develop the
minerals or periodically compensate lessors.58 Inclusion of a primary term and
surrender clauses help distinguish a lease from a deed.59 Today, the habendum
clause of an oil and gas lease typically permits the lease to effectively continue
following the primary term, as long as commercial production subsists.60
Essentially, an oil and gas lease terminates after expiration of the primary term or
following cessation of production.61

51

Id. § 12.2(3).

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 30, 371 P.3d 120, 127 (Wyo. 2016)
(quoting 5 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 64.6 (Matthew Bender, rev.
ed. 2015) (“Under traditional landlord-tenant law, a landlord can hold both the original tenant
and the tenant’s assignee liable for breach of a lease covenant that runs with the estate. The original
tenant is liable under the initial contractual agreement (privity of contract) with the lessor, and
the assignee is liable because it has accepted the benefit of the leasehold estate and must accept its
attached burdens as well (privity of estate).”)).
52

53

See 1 Martin, supra note 2, § 218.

54

2 Martin & Kramer, supra note 26, § 324.

55

1 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 218.

3 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 601
(LexisNexis ed. 2016).
56

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

See 1 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 206(13), (15).

2-26 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26.1 (Matthew Bender,
rev. ed. 2015).
60

61

See id.
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C. Governing Law to Establish Liability After Assignment in Wyoming
and Other Jurisdictions
In a recent and related case, Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, the
Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the assignor remained liable under
a surface use agreement after assigning the agreement to a third party.62 The
court declined to apply property law in reaching its decision, and instead analyzed
the issue from a contract perspective.63 The court has also applied contract law
in other cases involving the assignment of oil and gas interests.64 For example, in
Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, the court found the assignor liable for payments to
the assignee’s successor based on explicit obligations in the contract, and because
the assignor could not delegate the duty under the applicable statute.65 Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Texas applied contract principles and held an assignor
liable for duties under a joint operating agreement following assignment.66
When deciding issues according to property tenets, the Wyoming Supreme
Court accepted the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes as persuasive law.67
Further, the court concluded that “when the covenant inures to the benefit of, or
must be fulfilled by, whatever party holds the land at the time when fulfillment is
due,” that is determinative of whether covenants run with the land.68 To resolve
whether covenants run with the land, the court provided a four-part test: “1) the
original covenant is enforceable; 2) the parties to the original covenant intended
that the covenant run with the land; 3) the covenant touches and concerns the
land; and 4) there is privity of estate between the parties to the dispute.”69 The
court distinguished ongoing liability under a landlord-tenant lease from that
in a fee absolute conveyance.70 To determine whether liability continues and a
covenant is enforceable following assignment, the court examines the type of
covenant and the associated estate.71 Even after assignment of property in fee

62

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, 2015 WY 152, ¶ 4, 363 P.3d 18, 20.

63

Id. at ¶ 25, 363 P.3d at 25.

64

See infra note 65 and accompanying text.

65

Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 100, 107, 226 P.3d 889, 924 –25.

66

Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006).

Hasvold v. Park Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 14, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (reversing
and remanding a finding that two adjacent dominant estates had valid easements across the
servient estate).
67

68

Lingle Water Users’ Ass’n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 297 P. 385, 387 (Wyo. 1931).

Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2007 WY 161, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 61, 65– 66
(Wyo. 2007) (quoting Jackson Hole Racquet Club Resort v. Teton Pines Ltd. Partnership, 839 P.2d
951, 956 (Wyo. 1992)).
69

70
Lingle, 297 P. at 389 (quoting West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600,
632, 46 Am. Rep. 527 (1883)).
71

Id. 297 P. at 389, 392.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss2/8

8

Romano: OIL AND GAS LAW—Owning Liability Without Ownership Rights: Harmon

2017

Case Note

399

absolute, courts have found an assignor can remain liable for covenants it is able
to perform even if the assignor no longer owns the property rights.72

D. Split Estate Act
Responding to increasing oil and gas development and ensuing friction
between surface owner and operator interests, the Wyoming Legislature
drafted the Split Estate Act (the Act) to broaden surface owners’ rights and
available tools.73 The governor signed the Act into effect in 2005.74 Under the
Act, a “Surface owner” is any party owning an interest in the surface estate
upon which oil and gas development occurs, and this definition excludes
mineral ownership.75
Operators seeking to perform oil and gas operations impacting the surface
estate must provide notice and negotiate with the surface owner in good faith to
acquire permission to enter their land.76 Alternatively, the operator must execute
a bond or guaranty for surface reclamation in an amount equal to or greater than
“two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per well site on the land.”77 The Wyoming Oil
& Gas Conservation Commission will release the bond or guaranty only after the
operator pays the surface owner damages and the surface owner signs a release.78
The Act includes payments “intended to compensate the surface owner for
damage and disruption” and states, “[n]o person shall sever from the land surface
the right to receive surface damage payments.”79 If operators fail to pay surface

72
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4 (listing several cases in the Reporter’s
Note demonstrating ongoing liability following fee absolute assignment: “City of Glendale v. Barclay,
94 Ariz. 358, 385 P.2d 230 (1963) (in the absence of express terms of assignment, developer’s
promise to city to build sewage facilities was a personal real covenant; developer’s obligation was
thus contractual and developer remained liable after conveyance of property)”; “Indian Lake
Maintenance, Inc. v. Oxford First Corp., 572 So.2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (developer’s
liability to pay maintenance assessments for upkeep of streets, golf course, and clubhouse not
terminated by unrecorded agreements for deeds)”; “Associated Grocers of Iowa Coop., Inc. v.
West, 297 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1980) (developer sold an option on lots in a commercial development, promising in the contract to build rail spurs and pave streets upon exercise of the
option; obligation was personal and enforceable by purchaser after developer lost remainder of
parcel in foreclosure).”).
73
See Cox, supra note 8, at 39, http://digitaleditions.walsworthprintgroup.com/publication/
?i=197015&article_id= 1633994&view=articleBrowser&ver=html5#{%22issue_id%22:197015,%
22view%22:%22articleBrowser%22,%22article_id%22:%221633994%22.
74

2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws 81.

75

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-401 (2016).

76

Id. § 30-5-402(c)(i)–(iii).

77

Id. §§ 30-5-402(c)(iv), 30-5-404(b).

78

Id. § 30-5-404(e)(i)–(ii).

79

Id. § 30-5-405(a)(iii).
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owners pursuant to the Act, surface owners may bring suit, subject to a two-year
statute of limitations.80 Rights granted to surface owners under the Act are in
addition to those provided by law or contract.81 The Wyoming Constitution also
limits the court’s discretion related to statutory enforcement and construction,
prohibiting application of “statutes contrary to legislative intent once that intent
has been ascertained.”82

III. Principal Case
A. Background
Pennaco Energy Inc. (“Pennaco”) purchased oil and gas leases in the Powder
River Basin and Brett L. Sorenson owned the surface above some of the under
lying mineral leases, granted by multiple third-party owners.83 Sorenson granted
Pennaco a surface use agreement in 2001 to accommodate drilling operations
across his land.84 The surface use agreement included obligations requiring
the grantee, Pennaco, to make annual payments and maintain and reclaim the
surface.85 Pursuant to its surface use agreement and oil and gas leases, Pennaco
drilled shallow coal bed methane wells and utilized Sorenson’s surface estate
for operations.86
Pennaco sold its rights under various oil and gas leases and surface use
agreements, including Sorenson’s, in a 2010 purchase and sale agreement and
associated assignments to CEP-M Purchase, LLC (“CEP-M”).87 CEP-M later
assigned these same rights to High Plains.88 Pennaco properly made the annual
payments due under the Sorenson surface use agreement prior to its sale to
CEP-M.89 Following the 2010 assignment from Pennaco to CEP-M, neither
CEP-M nor High Plains made the required annual payments or reclaimed
the surface.90
Sorenson brought suit against High Plains, CEP-M, and Pennaco for default
under the surface use agreement, seeking the outstanding annual payments and
80

Id. §§ 30-5-406, 409.

81

Id. § 30-5-407.

82

Allied-Signal v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991).

83

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 7, 371 P.3d 120, 122 (Wyo. 2016).

84

Id. at ¶ 6 –7, 371 P.3d at 122.

85

Id. at ¶ 8, 371 P.3d at 123.

86

Id. at ¶ 10, 371 P.3d at 123.

87

Id. at ¶ 12, 371 P.3d at 123 –124.

88

Id. at ¶ 12, 371 P.3d at 124.

89

Id. at ¶ 11, 371 P.3d at 123.

90

Id. at ¶ 13, 371 P.3d at 124.
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damages for unperformed reclamation.91 CEP-M and High Plains failed to
respond to the complaint.92 Pennaco motioned for summary judgment, alleging
the 2010 assignment extinguished its duties.93 The district court denied Pennaco’s
motion, finding as a matter of law Pennaco was liable under the surface use
agreement, and put only the issue of damages before the jury.94 Pennaco motioned
for judgment as a matter of law regarding the claim for damages after Sorenson
presented his case, and the court also denied this motion.95 The jury awarded
Sorenson damages totaling $1,055,982.62.96 In Pennaco’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law, it again opposed ongoing liability under the surface
use agreement.97 The court denied this motion and granted Sorenson’s subsequent
motion, awarding him attorney fees.98
Pennaco appealed the district court’s decision and the Wyoming Supreme
Court considered the matter of attorney fees.99 The court also examined the issue
of significance to this Case Note: whether the district court erred in finding as a
matter of law that Pennaco’s liability under the surface use agreement continued
after assignment to a third party.100

B. Controlling Law to Determine Ongoing Liability Under Surface
Use Agreements
Pennaco contended the court should apply property law to resolve liability
under the surface use agreement.101 Relying on the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes, Pennaco argued the obligations under the agreement were covenants
running with the land.102 Pennaco posited that because the covenants ran with the
mineral estate, it was not liable for obligations accruing after assigning the surface
use agreement and oil and gas leases to a successor.103

91

Id. at ¶ 13 –14, 371 P.3d at 124.

92

Id. at ¶ 14, 371 P.3d at 124.

93

Id. at ¶ 15, 371 P.3d at 124.

94

Id. at ¶ 16, 371 P.3d at 124.

95

Id. at ¶ 17, 371 P.3d at 124.

96

Id. at ¶ 19, 371 P.3d at 125.

97

Id.

98

Id. at ¶ 20, 371 P.3d at 125.

99

Id. at ¶ 5, 371 P.3d at 122.

100

Id.

101

Id. at ¶ 27, 371 P.3d at 126.

102

Id.

103

Id.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court looked to its recent decision in Pennaco
Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC.104 In that case, the court held contract law, and not
property principles, resolves liability disputes under a surface use agreement.105
Expanding on contract doctrine, the court discussed an obligor’s ability to assign
rights and simultaneously only delegate duties, without express novation.106 If
an obligor-delegant did not remain liable, “every solvent person could obtain
freedom from debts by delegating them to an insolvent.”107 The court applied
the delegation principle to the subject surface use agreement.108 In doing so, the
court noted Pennaco’s oil and gas lease included an exculpatory clause, whereas its
surface use agreement did not.109 The court also observed the related Pennaco oil
and gas lease did not include language integrating the surface use agreement.110
As a result, “absent an express exculpatory clause, a lessee continues to remain
liable to the lessor for a breach of an express covenant in the oil and gas lease after
assignment, even if the express covenants run with the land.”111
After deciding contract law governed the liability issue, the Pennaco court
analyzed the language of the surface use agreement de novo.112 The court stated it
would not read in terms or rewrite an unambiguous contract.113 In examining the
ordinary meaning and plain language within the four corners of the surface use
agreement, the court found the parties’ intent was clear and the agreement did not
create any servitudes to justify the application of property law.114 The court likened
oil and gas leases to surface use agreements, both requiring an exculpatory clause
or novation to relieve an assignor of ongoing liability.115 Without an exculpatory
clause in the surface use agreement or novation from Sorenson to demonstrate
intent otherwise, the court found Pennaco’s liability continued under the surface
use agreement pursuant to contract principles.116 For these reasons, the court

104

Id. at ¶ 28, 371 P.3d at 126.

105

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, 2015 WY 152, ¶ 87, 363 P.3d 18, 40 (Wyo. 2015).

106

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 29, 371 P.3d 120, 127 (Wyo. 2016).

107

Id. at ¶ 29, 371 P.3d at 127.

108

Id. at ¶ 30, 371 P.3d at 127.

109

Id. at ¶ 31, 33, 371 P.3d at 127–128.

110

Id. at ¶ 32, 371 P.3d at 128.

111

Id. at ¶ 30, 371 P.3d at 127.

112

Id. at ¶ 41, 371 P.3d at 129.

113

Id. at ¶¶ 38, 41, 371 P.3d at 130.

Id. at ¶¶ 41– 42, 44, 371 P.3d at 129 –130 (stating “[t]he contract contains nothing
indicating that the parties intended servitudes to be created under property law principles so
that Pennaco would be able to relieve itself of these obligations merely by assigning them to a
third party.”).
114

115

Id. at ¶ 45, 371 P.3d at 130.

116

Id.
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affirmed the conclusion of the district court, holding Pennaco liable under the
surface use agreement following assignment.117

IV. Analysis
The Pennaco court properly held the operator remained liable following
assignment of a surface use agreement, absent an exculpatory clause or
novation.118 However, the court incorrectly confined its analysis to contract law,
resulting in unsettled property questions and unanticipated practical implications for both surface owners and operators.119 Additional harm to both parties
may stem from miscalculating the significance of the Pennaco decision; in effect,
a landscape where surface owners would have no recourse for unpaid surface
damages and unperformed reclamation, and operators might face unsurmountable
costs and financial crisis.120

A. Missing the Mark: The Contract Approach
The Pennaco court correctly held where the operator failed to include an
exculpatory clause in the surface use agreement or obtain a novation, its liability
continued after assignment to a third party.121 Examining the contract on its face
and within its four corners, the plain language of the surface use agreement did
not include an exculpatory clause.122 Ideally as part of its original transaction with
Sorenson, Pennaco could have protected against ongoing liability by including
an exculpatory clause in its surface use agreement, holding any assignee-successor
in interest wholly liable for any breach arising after assignment.123 Absent an
exculpatory clause, Pennaco could have subsequently negotiated an agreement
with Sorenson to terminate Pennaco’s liability.124 If the assignee expressly agreed
to assume all liability and Sorenson authorized the release, Pennaco would have
been concurrently discharged of its duties when it assigned its rights.125 However,
Pennaco did not acquire any such novation.126
The clear and unambiguous language, and absence of any associated
novation, indicated the parties’ apparent intent that Pennaco remain liable
117

Id. at ¶ 46, 371 P.3d at 131.

118

See id.

119

See infra notes 213 – 42 and accompanying text.

120

See infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text.

121

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 46, 371 P.3d 120, 131 (Wyo. 2016).

122

Id.

123

See Kuntz, supra note 56, § 64.6.

124

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 280.

125

See id. § 280, illus. 1.

126

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 46, 371 P.3d 120, 131 (Wyo. 2016).
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under the surface use agreement, including for any breach after assignment.127
If the agreement terms had been ambiguous, the results may have differed with
two unsophisticated parties.128 However, in this case, the agreement would be
construed against Pennaco as the drafter and a sophisticated business party to
the transaction.129
Alternatively, since the oil and gas lease associated with the minerals
underlying Sorenson’s surface included an exculpatory clause,130 Pennaco could
have integrated the oil and gas lease into the surface use agreement to serve as a
functional equivalent of including this clause in the surface use agreement itself.131
Insertion of an exculpatory clause in the oil and gas lease provides evidence of
Pennaco’s awareness of this type of language, as a repeat-player in the industry.132
The surface use agreement referenced the oil and gas lease, stating the “rights-ofway [granted by the surface use agreement] shall be a covenant running with the
lease.”133 Nonetheless, the parties did not expressly incorporate the language of
the oil and gas lease into the surface use agreement.134 Notwithstanding terms in
the oil and gas lease creating surface easements, the surface use agreement granted
Pennaco broader surface rights and simultaneously increased its obligations.135
Although the surface estate interrelates to the underlying mineral estate by nature,
absent explicit incorporation by reference in the surface use agreement and/or
oil and gas lease, the two contracts cannot be read together.136 Therefore, the
court properly concluded the surface use agreement could not implicitly integrate
the exculpatory clause of the oil and gas lease, and the two contracts were to be
construed separately.137
Expanding its contract analysis, the court recognized the oil and gas lease
and surface use agreement as “allied contracts” and “yoked together” because
mineral operations necessitate surface use.138 While the latter supposition is

127

See Perillo, supra note 29, §18–25 (7th ed. 2014); 2 Martin supra note 26, § 403.1.

128

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b.

See id.; Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912
P.2d 529, 532 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Prudential Preferred Properties v. Underwood Ranch Co., 873
P.2d 598, 600 (Wyo. 1994)).
129

130

Sorenson, ¶ 15 n. 8, 371 P.3d at 124.

131

See Williston on Contracts § 30:25 (3d ed.).

132

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b.

Brief for Appellant at 27, Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, 371 P.3d 120
(Wyo. 2016) (No. S-15-0210) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
133

134

Sorenson, ¶ 32, 371 P.3d at 127.

135

See id. at ¶ 7, 371 P.3d at 123.

136

See Williston on Contracts § 30:25 (3d ed.).

137

Sorenson, ¶¶ 32, 41, 371 P.3d at 127.

138

Id. at ¶¶ 33 –34, 371 P.3d 120, 128.
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accurate, the court’s dicta did little to support its decision to utilize a contractcentric methodology.139 By highlighting the inherent union between developing
the surface estate while producing from the underlying mineral estate, even
where no contract language incorporated the oil and gas lease into the surface use
agreement, the court inadvertently alluded to the prevailing property principles
demanding further examination.140
In continuing its trend to attempt restricting the surface use agreement
liability to a question of contract law, the court haphazardly discarded Pennaco’s
foundational real property argument.141 While some courts have relied on
contract principles alone to analyze assignment liability in the realm of oil and gas
operations, those courts were not faced with the same property disputes posed in
the instant case.142 Although contract law is relevant to this case, the Pennaco court
should have expanded its limited analysis and incorporated property principles
to provide a fully informed decision.143 The Pennaco court’s evasion and circular
reasoning left unclear whether Pennaco’s argument could have prevailed and what
property theory applies.144

B. Misdirection: Servitude or Landlord-Tenant Law
Pennaco misconstrued the crucial property principles, arguing the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes establishes the subject surface use
agreement created an easement, the covenants ran with the mineral estate, and
by assigning the underlying oil and gas lease, Pennaco was no longer liable under
the surface use agreement.145 Pennaco urged finding otherwise would create

139

See infra notes 155 –56 and accompanying text.

140

See Sorenson, ¶ 33, 371 P.3d at 128.

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC was somewhat analogous to the current case and
Pennaco was a common denominator. While KD Co. LLC was a step in the right direction, at
least recognizing the crucial property principles, the KD Co. LLC court still erroneously found the
surface use agreement did not create a servitude and the court muddled the applicable property
theory. KD Co. LLC misdirected its narrow analysis to rest solely on contract law, while improperly
characterizing property principles. The instant case relies on KD Co. LLC to establish contract law
controls, but unlike KD Co. LLC, this case regresses and omits all but a superficial property analysis.
See id. at ¶ 27, 371 P.3d at 126; Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, 2015 WY 152, ¶ 87, 363
P.3d 18, 40 (Wyo. 2015).
141

142
See e.g. Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006)
(holding seller and assignee of oil and gas leases remained liable under an operating agreement where
Appellant and Appellee both offered arguments regarding contract principles); Ultra Res., Inc. v.
Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 100, 107, 226 P.3d 889, 924-25 (concluding operators were liable to
successors in interest under an assignment of leases including a clause for Net Profit Interest payable
to leaseholder, based on the parties’ allegations under statutory provisions and contract law).
143

See infra notes 145–99 and accompanying text.

144

See infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.

145

Brief for Appellant, supra note 133, at 19–32.
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an absurd result, holding a predecessor mineral owner perpetually liable.146 In
opposition, Sorenson created a false dichotomy, alleging even if property law was
determinative, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes was inapplicable and
Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord & Tenant applied instead to hold lessee
liable after assignment.147
Given the unavoidable property roots in this case, the Pennaco court
superficially brushed on easements, covenants, and servitudes generally.148
Nevertheless, the court expressly stated its analysis relied solely on contract law.149
For some onlookers, the court’s silence may fallaciously suggest disavowing
the single rule under both Restatements, requiring continued liability of the
burdened assigning party where a servitude exists between a landlord and tenant.150
The definition and scope of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
immediately calls into question whether the doctrine would govern in this case,
because where special rules or considerations pertain to “covenants in leases” or
“profits for the removal of . . . oil, gas, and minerals,” the Restatement does not
apply.151 While the court acknowledged the interdependent nature of the surface
use agreement and oil and gas lease, Pennaco contended the two agreements were
categorically distinct.152 Pennaco asserted the surface use agreement related to the
surface only (and not the minerals for this isolated analysis), and accordingly
the presumption that an assigning party is relieved of liability applied.153 Yet, to
arrive at its conclusion of extinguished liability, Pennaco argued the surface and
minerals are tied closely together and the surface use agreement creates an easement
appurtenant to the oil and gas lease.154 This mirrors the juxtaposed reasoning
of the Pennaco court, suggesting the two agreements be analyzed independently,
but also underscoring the associated rights unified by their singular purpose of
oil and gas operations.155 The Pennaco court could have clarified what seems to
be a revolving argument by directly confronting the looming property issue for
bewildered bystanders.156

146

Brief for Appellant, supra note 133, at 41–53.

Brief for Appellee at 33, Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, 371 P.3d 120
(Wyo. 2016) (No. S-15-0210) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
147

148

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 29, 371 P.3d 120, 127–130 (Wyo. 2016).

149

See Sorenson, ¶ 28, 371 P.3d at 126.

150

See infra notes 187– 88.

151

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 1.1(a), (c).

152

Sorenson, ¶ 34, 371 P.3d at 128 –29.

153

Brief for Appellant, supra note 133, at 44.

154

Brief for Appellant, supra note 133, at 19, 21.

155

Sorenson, ¶ 34, 371 P.3d at 129.

156

See id.
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Even if the covenants created by the surface use agreement are of the type
proving problematic, the special rules defined in Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes, § 4.4 hold a party liable for servitude burdens only if those obligations accrue when the party owns the burdened property interest.157 Pennaco
claims the breached annual payment and reclamation obligations did not accrue
until after Pennaco assigned its interest in the surface use agreement and oil
and gas leases.158 On the other hand, Sorenson argued Pennaco became liable
when it impacted the surface by drilling wells pursuant to its rights under the
surface use agreement.159
Furthermore, § 4.4 states contract law governs a party’s liability for a servitude
in gross.160 These property principles are not rigid applications, but instead serve
to achieve the overarching goal of enforcing the parties’ intentions if they elect to
define the “duration of their rights and obligations under a servitude.”161 Treating
the covenants under the agreement as a servitude burden in gross requires
individually examining the assigned surface use agreement under the principles of
contract law.162 Pennaco remains liable under the surface use agreement pursuant
to the aforementioned contract analysis.163 Although assessing a servitude in gross
requires returning to the contract question, it still acknowledges the surface use
agreement is grounded in property law to a greater extent than the Pennaco court
was willing to concede.164

C. The Property Question Refocused: Intention of the Parties and Character
of the Promise
Unfortunately, the court and parties relied on artificial and formalistic
reasoning in applying the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.165 The
court’s reliance on Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC and its transitory comments
in the current case improperly suggest the surface use agreement did not create
a servitude.166 However, the duties created under the surface use agreement are
undeniably a servitude (covenant) running with the land, because the promise

157

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4(1).

158

Brief for Appellant, supra note 133, at 33.

159

Brief for Appellee, supra note 147, at 52.

160

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4(3).

161

Id. § 4.4 cmt. a.

162

Id. § 4.4(3).

163

See supra notes 121–37.

164

See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4(3).

165

See infra notes 166 –200 and accompanying text.

Id. at ¶ 44, 371 P.3d at 130; Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, 2015 WY 152, ¶ 68,
363 P.3d 18, 36 (Wyo. 2015) (“The parties’ relationship here is much more similar to a lease or
standard contract than it is to unending covenants based on land ownership.”)
166
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to make annual payments and reclaim the surface was made with the intent to
bind, touches and concerns the land, and satisfies horizontal and vertical privity.167
In spite of this, the servitude question is not dispositive of whether a party
is relieved of liability.168 By applying this misleading and false distinction and
not correcting course, the Pennaco court opens the possibility for future mistakes
if parties believe liability would be extinguished by the existence of a servitude,
though this is not remotely what § 4.4 suggests.169
Instead of framing the determinative property issue as a covenant question,
§ 4.4 hinges on the parties’ intentions and character of the promise to determine
liability.170 The Restatement addresses situations in which parties may be relieved
of liability and also recognizes covenants between landlord and tenant.171 It
is presumed covenants may not be extinguished by assignment in a landlordtenant relationship because of the expectations tied to the nature of the
promise.172 A fundamental policy at the core of leaseholds is the landlord’s
reliance on the original tenant’s ability to perform its duties under the lease.173
Another quintessential characteristic of a lease is the limited duration of the
estate.174 In contrast, an assignment in fee absolute differs from the character
of a promise under a lease because the duration of a fee estate is indeterminate
and the expectation is that upon assignment, the assignor’s duty to perform a
covenant terminates.175
As noted, the Pennaco surface use agreement is independent of the oil and gas
lease.176 Without explicit incorporation, that the two contracts are closely related
is not enough to import one into the other.177 The surface use agreement instead
creates an affirmative covenant ancillary to the leasehold because of Sorenson’s
expectancy of returning to possession, the limited duration of the oil and gas
lease and related surface use agreement, and the payment and restoration obligation
on the benefitted land as a central purpose of the surface use agreement.178
Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2007 WY 161, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 61, 65-66 (Wyo.
2007) (quoting Jackson Hole Racquet Club Resort v. Teton Pines Ltd. Partnership, 839 P.2d 951,
956 (Wyo. 1992)).
167

168

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4 cmt. b.

169

See id.

170

Id.

171

Id. § 4.4.

172

Id. § 4.4 cmt. b.

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

See supra notes 134 –37.

177

See id.

178

See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4 cmt. b.
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The subject oil and gas lease explicitly labeled the contract as a “lease” and
included a five-year term.179 While the oil and gas lease continued until ninety
days following cessation of production, the expectation was clear the lease term
(and the appurtenant surface use agreement lasting for the life of the oil and gas
lease) was limited and not a mineral deed in fee.180 Thus, as leasehold tenant,
Pennaco’s ancillary obligations under the surface use agreement were not released
after assignment.181 Although wells may produce for decades and hold a lease,
that does not change the expectation of eventually returning the property to the
landlord-lessor.182
The objective under the surface use agreement is apparent, requiring
annual payments until reclamation occurs on the surface, in conjunction with
oil and gas operations.183 Landlord-tenant law elaborates and notes the duty of
restoration inherent in leaseholds, akin to those covenants under the surface
use agreement.184 According to landlord-tenant law, Pennaco as leseee-tenant
remains liable for non-performance of obligations under the surface use
agreement, even after assignment.185 Sorenson entered into the surface use
agreement relying on Pennaco to be financially responsible for performance, and
with the expectation Pennaco would return its interests in the lease to Sorenson,
as landlord fee owner.186
While both parties and the court oscillated in attempt to draw a line between
the Restatements, the underlying principle is identical and they are not discrete
bodies of law.187 The Restatements describe the context of a servitude between
landlord and tenant, expecting the assignor, as original tenant, to remain liable
for covenants under a leasehold estate.188 Regrettably, the court’s perfunctory
property analysis does not follow from this central principle in the Restatements,
and does not implement any policy other than contract law.189

179

Brief for Appellant at 54.

180

See Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 206(13), (15).

181

See Id.

See Kuntz, supra note 60, § 26.1 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2015); Martin & Kramer,
supra note 56, § 601.
182

183

See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶ 8, 371 P.3d 120, 123 (Wyo. 2016).

Id. at ¶ 8, 371 P.3d at 123; Restatement (Second)
§ 12.2(3).
184

of

Prop.: Landlord & Tenant

185

See Sorenson at ¶ 30, 371 P.3d 120, 127 (quoting Kuntz, supra note 33, § 64.6).

186

Id. at ¶ 7, 371 P.3d at 122; 3 Martin & Kramer, supra note 2, § 601.

See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant § 12.2(3); Restatement
(Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4 cmt. b.
187

188

Id.

189

Sorenson, ¶ 28, 371 P.3d 120, 126.
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Furthermore, it is equally true under oil and gas law that lessees are not
released from liability simply by assigning a lease.190 Whether an oil and gas lease
or appurtenant surface use agreement is labeled as a lease or given an alternate
title, the expectations of the parties and character of the covenant remain the
predominant principles to determine ongoing liability.191 The reclamation
obligation itself manifests the intention Pennaco remain liable.192 The very fact
duties traveled with the surface use agreement because Pennaco drilled wells and
impacted the surface, the covenant is appurtenant to an interest intended to
end, and that Sorenson ultimately expected reclamation, relying on Pennaco’s
creditworthiness to perform as party to the contract, all indicate intended ongoing
liability.193 Pursuant to oil and gas law, the character of the promise governing the
lessor-lessee relationship under the Pennaco surface use agreement is the type in
which parties intend lessee-assignor’s liability to continue.194
Pennaco mischaracterizes its argument, focusing on the unfairness of
perpetual liability and the assignor’s inability to perform obligations following
a fee assignment.195 Despite the surface use agreement’s “right-of-way and
easement” grant language, the covenant was appurtenant to the mineral estate,
effective as long as the oil and gas lease was in force.196 Thus, Pennaco was not a fee
mineral owner and cannot be treated as such.197 Additionally, courts have held an
assignor may remain liable for covenants under fee assignments where it does not
need to maintain ownership to perform the covenant.198 Likewise, Pennaco’s
affirmative covenant did not require retaining ownership rights to perform
reclamation on Sorenson’s surface.199 Pennaco’s reservation of reclamation rights
under the surface use agreement, indicated in its Purchase and Sale Agreement
with assignee, further supports the latter supposition.200

190

Id. at ¶ 30, 371 P.3d at 127 (quoting Kuntz, supra note 33, § 64.6).

191

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4.

192

See id.; Sorenson, ¶ 30, 371 P.3d at 127 (quoting Kuntz, supra note 33, § 64.6).

193

See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4 cmt. b.

194

See id.

See Lingle Water Users’ Ass’n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 43 Wyo. 41, 49, 297 P. 385,
387 (Wyo. 1931); See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4 cmt. b, illus. 2.
195

196

See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: servitudes § 4.4.

See Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson, 2016 WY 34, ¶¶ 34, 42, 371 P.3d 120, 128, 130
(Wyo. 2016).
197

198

See supra note 72.

199

See supra note 72.

200

Brief for Appellee, supra note 147, at 54.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss2/8

20

Romano: OIL AND GAS LAW—Owning Liability Without Ownership Rights: Harmon

2017

Case Note

411

D. Legislative Policy: The Split Estate Act
Adhering to legislative authority and purpose is equally significant to
the application of property law in this case.201 The Split Estate Act reflects the
underlying public policy objective to ensure operators reclaim surface owners’
property.202 Instead of tying oil and gas leases and surface use agreements
together, the Act articulates the surface owner is distinctly separate from the
mineral owner.203 The Wyoming Legislature makes apparent its goal to safeguard
surface owners and make them whole by not relieving operators’ liability until
they pay surface owners a mutually agreeable sum.204 While the Act does not
expressly address assignment of operator interests, the Act makes clear the surface
owner’s right to receive surface damages is not severable and a surface owner
may sue for such damages if the operator neglects to make payment.205 In
fairness to operators, the Act requires a surface owner bring suit “within two
(2) years after the damage has been discovered, or should have been discovered
through due diligence, by the surface owner.”206
Construing this case by misapplying contrary formalism could possibly
support a finding Sorenson had no recourse.207 Doing so would promote
opposition to the established rule and policy expressed by the Legislature, granting
surface owners explicit rights to surface damage compensation.208 Analyzing
this case with the Act’s policy in mind and in light of what is fair and just, calls
attention to the significant timeline: Pennaco conducted drilling operations
in 2001, shut down operations in 2009, and assigned its operating interests
in 2010.209 The successors in interest to Pennaco did not conduct any drilling
operations following assignment.210 Thus, any surface impacts to Sorenson’s
land resulted from Pennaco’s operations.211 While ongoing liability is not one
Pennaco, or any similarly situated operator, would desire after assigning its interest
in oil and gas leases and surface use agreements, without an exculpatory clause in
the surface use agreement or subsequent novation, continued liability is exactly
what property, contract, oil and gas law, and the Wyoming Legislature dictate.212
201

See Allied-Signal v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991).

202

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-401– 410 (2016).

203

Id. § 30-5-401.
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E. Aftermath and Remedies
The property issue in this case is weighty, and a holistic analysis by the
court addressing Pennaco’s argument could have resolved practitioner, surface
owner, and operator inquiries moving forward.213 Instead, the Pennaco court
strategically dodged the property question and treated the dispute in this case as
a contract delegation issue to reach the desired outcome.214 Although the court
arrived at the correct conclusion, the framework applied was flawed.215
Coupling the reasoning in this case with its predecessor, Pennaco Energy,
Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, sends a dangerous message.216 In any other context, if a
court had to decide if the sort of promise under the surface use agreement in this
case was a servitude, it would affirmatively find the parties created a covenant.217
Misuse of the Pennaco cases may result if the court misleads parties to absurdly
think promises like those under the surface use agreement are not covenants.218
Further, if the Pennaco decision misguides parties to believe determining
whether a promise is a covenant establishes an assignor’s liability, various
unforeseen property disputes may ensue.219
Energy is often synonymous with Wyoming’s economy, serving as an
essential source of revenue for the state.220 Practical implications abound for
surface owners impacted by oil and gas operations if the Pennaco case misleads
naïve operators to assume they are relieved of liability after assignment of a
surface use agreement containing a servitude but not an exculpatory clause, or
equally catastrophic, believe no covenant exists.221 Additionally, unscrupulous
operators could collude to cheat surface owners in circumstances where assignor
and assignee recognize assignee is on the brink of bankruptcy.222 Either situation
results in a surface owner fighting to collect damage payments, and with land
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impacted by exploration activities that operators may never reclaim; the very
outcome the Pennaco court sought to avoid.223
The Pennaco decision could also provide a false sense of optimism for
operators, mistakenly believing liability terminates by assigning agreements
without exculpatory clauses if a servitude exists.224 Consequently, operators may
not allocate budget funds for exposure to possible financial risks where successors
in interest to surface use agreements become insolvent or simply breach the
contract, and the assignor must fulfill the monetary obligations.225 Sudden
significant costs could blindside unsuspecting operators, and their error
and oversight could result in their own demise when operating budgets are
constricted or during market downturns.226
The Wyoming Legislature manifested the underlying policy favoring
surface reclamation in the Split Estate Act.227 Even so, with liability disputes like
those in Pennaco, the public may believe lawmakers could do more.228 In this
case, the surface damages far exceeded the allocated “two thousand dollars
($ 2,000.00) per well site” provided for under the Act.229 This case could serve
as a call to the Legislature to increase the required bond amount to align more
closely with the realities of actual drilling surface impacts.230 Yet, the existing
reclamation figure is presumed to be sufficient for the majority of cases if the
legislature assigned that amount.231 Furthermore, while increased bond amounts
could heighten the deference the few questionable operators give to surface
damage obligations, an increase could also penalize and discourage responsible and
ethical operators and be proportionally more burdensome on smaller companies.
Alternatively, the Legislature could further adjust bonding requirements
for assignees, requiring any successor in interest to an oil and gas lease and/
or surface use agreement to execute a bond or guaranty under the Split Estate
Act.232 Functionally, the latter may be achieved under the current statutes if
an assignee submits a permit to drill where no surface use agreement exists.233
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However, currently if an oil and gas lease and associated surface use agreement
is assigned with no further action by an assignee to drill, the successor does not
need to supply any new bond or guaranty.234 Unfortunately, additional bonding
requirements for every assignment of oil and gas lease or surface use agreement
could put a substantial administrative burden on the state.
Instead, the Pennaco court puts operators on notice to evidence clear
contract intent by including an exculpatory clause or obtaining a subsequent
novation to extinguish assignor’s liability under a surface use agreement.235 This
demands operators’ due diligence in drafting future contracts and revisiting
previous conveyances.236 Operators must also examine practical considerations
accompanying operations and unforeseen repercussions, effects of downturned
markets, and bankruptcies.237 If past agreements lack exculpatory clauses or an
operator failed to obtain a novation at the time of assignment, the informed
operator-assignor may find it worth its time to contact assignees and surface
owners alike to mitigate risks by seeking grants of additional language terminating
assignor’s future liability.238
With increasing scrutiny on the fossil fuel industry, companies should
operate their business and conduct transactions conscientiously to avoid
missteps that could possibly cost millions of dollars.239 Without decisive guidance
from the Pennaco court, operators must acknowledge the nature of leasehold
covenants and risks of ongoing liability.240 An exculpatory clause in agreements
or novation is the best solution to terminate liability upon assignment.241 Failure
to obtain such protections may result in surface owner claims against an assignor,
and negotiations or simply performing the reclamation may outweigh the
operator’s costs to litigate. There will likely be more hard lessons learned looking
ahead if operators neglect curative measures and vigilance.242

V. Conclusion
Whether Pennaco remained liable under the surface use agreement should
not have been resolved as an isolated contract delegation question and the
Pennaco court erroneously omitted the property analysis of servitudes in a
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landlord-tenant relationship.243 Both characterizations of the liability dispute, in
the context of oil and gas law, lead conclusively to the same finding that Pennaco’s
liability continued.244 However, the foregoing analysis demonstrates directly
addressing the property law central to this case is a more fitting approach to
resolve the contrary outcomes of the hyper-formalistic arguments proposed.245
Well settled servitude principles establish Pennaco’s ongoing liability under
the surface use agreement, based on the parties’ intent and the character of the
promise, creating an affirmative covenant ancillary to the mineral leasehold.246 Yet,
by punting the property inquiry, the court missed the opportunity to elucidate
its confounded application of servitudes in this case for both surface owners
and operators, now perhaps exposed to greater potential impacts and risks.247
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